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STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC v. 
SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA, INC. 
Franklin A. Gevurtz 
INTRODUCTION 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.1 is one 
of the most contentious securities law decisions handed down by the United 
States Supreme Court in recent years.2  At issue in the case was the scope of 
liability created by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and by 
Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to that section.3  Specifically, the Court 
considered whether parties beyond the corporation issuing a false financial 
report could be held liable to private plaintiffs for their fraudulent acts in 
violation of these provisions.4  The defendants in the Stoneridge case were 
(in a somewhat unusual set of facts) third-party vendors of the corporation 
issuing the false statement,5 but everyone understood that the Supreme 
Court’s decision would impact accountants, lawyers, investment bankers, 
and the like, who have been involved in transactions resulting in fraudulent 
financial reporting.  As a result of the decision’s anticipated impact, the Su-
preme Court was inundated with amicus briefs.6  Given the current leaning 





  Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
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  128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (link). 
2
  See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 
AM. BUS. L.J. 611 (2008) (criticizing the decision) (link); Stuart Sinai, Stoneridge—Escape from Securi-
ties Liability Notwithstanding Active, Intentional, Deceptive Conduct, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 170 (2008) 
(same). 
3
  Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (link); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007) 
(link).   
4
  Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767, 773–74. 
5
  Id. at 766–67. 
6
  See, e.g., Brief of Ohio, Texas, and 30 Other States and Commonwealths as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, Stoneridge (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1957413; Brief of the New York State Teachers’ 
Retirement System, the Retirement Systems of Alabama, the Sacramento County Employees’ Retire-
ment System, and the Government of Guam Retirement Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Stoneridge (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701935; Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and 
Law and Finance Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stoneridge (No. 06-43), 2007 
WL 2329638; Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Stoneridge (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363260.  Links to all briefs filed in the case 
are available at http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Stoneridge_v._Scientific-Atlanta (link). 
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bly predictable.  Nevertheless, the decision is worth academic discussion 
because it illustrates how utterly irrational the law governing private securi-
ties fraud actions has become.7 
I. THE CASE     
Before undertaking a policy critique of the Stoneridge opinion, it is 
useful to take a brief look at the facts of the case and the Court’s decision.  
A. The Complaint 
Several years ago, a cable operator, Charter Communications, Inc., was 
having trouble meeting earnings expectations.8  According to the plaintiffs 
in Stoneridge, Charter’s management decided to make up for its underper-
formance through a time-honored technique—lying.9  More specifically, the 
plaintiffs alleged that Charter’s corporate officers decided to pretend that 
Charter was taking in more advertising revenue than it actually was.10  
There was just one little problem: Charter, as a public company, is required 
to have audited financial statements, and auditors are on the lookout for 
things like imaginary revenue numbers.  This concern, in turn, led Charter’s 
management to engage in a more elaborate scheme.  Purportedly, Charter’s 
management made an agreement with Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola (two 
companies from which Charter purchased digital cable converter boxes).  
The two vendors agreed to place ads with Charter, while Charter’s manag-
ers agreed to pay inflated prices on the cable boxes Charter ordered from 
them, so that the advertising purchased by Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola 
would, in fact, be free.11  In order to hide the swap, and thereby allow Char-
ter to claim revenue from selling the ads, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola 
allegedly backdated documents and misrepresented the facts as to the cable 
box sales.12 
B. The Decision 
Given that the plaintiffs alleged that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola 





  Even before Stoneridge, commentators with otherwise diverse perspectives had come to question 
whether the securities fraud class action served much social utility.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-
forming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1534, 1536–37 (2006) (suggesting that recovery against the corporation serves no purpose) (link); 
Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2004) (ar-
guing that securities fraud class actions are often meritless) (link). 
8
  Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766. 
9
  Id. 
10
  Id. 
11
  Id. at 766–67. 
12
  Id. at 767. 
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srepresentations would form the basis for false earnings reports issued by 
Charter,13 it would seem easy enough at first glance to find that the defen-
dants’ conduct fell within Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on fraud and false or 
misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.  
The case reached the Supreme Court, however, because of the Court’s ear-
lier decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.14  
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that persons cannot be held liable 
in a private action under Rule 10b-5 for aiding and abetting another per-
son’s fraud.15  Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola argued that the allegations 
against them essentially amounted to aiding and abetting Charter’s fraud, 
thereby bringing Central Bank into play.16  The problem for Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola, however, was that the Supreme Court had placed a 
seemingly significant caveat on its decision in Central Bank.  The Court 
specifically stated that, while there could be no private Rule 10b-5 action 
based solely on aiding and abetting, parties who themselves engaged in 
fraudulent conduct upon which investors relied would not simply be aiding 
and abetting.  Hence, such parties could be liable in a private Rule 10b-5 ac-
tion.17  It was this seemingly straightforward exception that the plaintiffs 
sought to invoke in Stoneridge.18 
While implicitly recognizing that, unlike the defendant in Central 
Bank, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola had allegedly engaged in misrepre-
sentation, the majority in Stoneridge still found no basis for liability.19  Ac-
cording to the majority, this was because the plaintiffs had not relied on the 
vendors’ misrepresentations.20  Specifically, since Charter reports only its 
composite revenue numbers to the public, and not all of the details about—
or documents supporting—the transactions that produced the composite 
numbers, the plaintiffs never would have seen the misrepresentations by 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.21  
II. THE CRITIQUE: GETTING BLINDED BY THE CORPORATE FICTION TO 
REACH AN IRRATIONAL RESULT 
A. Doctrinal Missteps 





  Id.  
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  511 U.S. 164 (1994) (link). 
15
  Id. at 176–80, 191. 
16
  Brief for Respondents at 16–38, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. 
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43) (link).  
17
  Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
18
  See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770–71. 
19
  See id. at 774. 
20
  Id. 
21
  Id. at 770. 
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perplexing.  The notion that the plaintiffs had not relied on Scientific-
Atlanta’s and Motorola’s misrepresentations because the plaintiffs had not 
seen those misrepresentations seems inconsistent with the indirect reliance 
inherent in the fraud on the market theory adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson.22  The fraud on the market theory is based upon the 
idea that traders in a market often rely on information they never see.  In-
stead, traders rely on other market actors who, in seeing and acting upon in-
formation they receive firsthand, impact the trading price of shares.23  The 
majority, in pointing out that the fraud on the market theory would not ap-
ply in Stoneridge because Scientific-Atlanta’s and Motorola’s misrepresen-
tations were never directly communicated to the public,24 gave short shrift 
to this fundamental point.   
The reason the majority did so, in substantial part, seems to be its con-
cern that imposing liability upon persons who aid a fraudulent scheme 
through misrepresentations could significantly limit the reach of Central 
Bank.25  Yet the Court in Central Bank explicitly stated that persons who 
themselves engage in fraud and misrepresentation would remain liable in a 
private action.26  Nothing in Central Bank ever suggested that its conclusion 
was dependent upon some sort of ―fraud hierarchy‖ under which misrepre-
sentations made in aid of another’s misrepresentation are treated differently 
from ―primary‖ misrepresentations; indeed, this would not have made sense 
given the context of the court’s comment in Central Bank.27 
B. The Real Policy Behind the Stoneridge Decision 
The Court’s expansion in Stoneridge of Central Bank’s immunity for 
secondary parties suggests that neither decision flows from doctrinal logic, 
but rather from a results-oriented policy determination.28  Put simply, these 
cases raise the question: Who ought to pay for securities fraud?  As is ap-
parent from the Supreme Court’s decision to confine liability to the per-
ceived primary wrongdoer, the answer is not so-called secondary offenders.  
Underlying this determination are two intuitions.  The first is that plaintiffs 
(or their attorneys) bring in peripheral parties in a sort of piggish grasping 





  485 U.S. 224 (1988) (link). 
23
  Id. at 246–47.  
24
  Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769–70. 
25
  Id. at 771–72.   
26
  Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
27
  See id. (stating that ―[i]n any complex securities fraud . . . there are likely to be multiple violators 
. . . .‖). 
28
  See A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy 
of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217 (explaining the court’s underly-
ing policy concerns) (link). 
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the heightened pleading requirements adopted by Congress in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199529—about innocent parties being 
sued and forced to settle Rule 10b-5 actions.  Coupled with this concern is 
the notion that the more defendants brought into securities fraud lawsuits, 
the more chance there is of suits against parties who actually did nothing 
wrong.  Yet, as appealing as these intuitions might seem, the question of 
who should pay for securities fraud calls for a more careful analysis.  Spe-
cifically, did the court in Stoneridge get it right in indentifying who was a 
real wrongdoer and ought to pay, and who was simply a peripheral player? 
Key to the Stoneridge majority’s approach is the conception that the 
corporation, Charter, committed the fraud.  Doctrinally, characterizing the 
matter as fraud by Charter allowed the court to conclude that any misrepre-
sentations by Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola were too remote to engender 
the plaintiffs’ reliance.30  From a policy standpoint, characterizing the mat-
ter as Charter’s fraud framed Charter as the primary wrongdoer upon whom 
any private action should focus, and reduced the import of any secondary 
bad acts engaged in by other parties.  The fundamental problem with the 
majority’s view, however, is that it rests upon a fiction: Charter, like any 
corporation, cannot knowingly make false statements—only people can.  
Hence, in actions for fraud filed pursuant to § 10(b), it is useful to pierce 
through the corporate fiction to ask some important questions.  Who kno-
wingly caused Charter to issue false earnings reports?  Who profited from 
them?  And what is the impact of imposing fraud liability solely upon Char-
ter? 
C. Whose Fraud Is It? 
Investors typically see (if they so choose) the corporation’s financial 
statements.  But to focus solely on these statements misunderstands the way 
in which financial reporting fraud commonly works.  The corporation’s fi-
nancial statements reflect the sum totals from innumerable transactions.  
Only in the most brazen and unsophisticated cases does financial fraud con-
sist of simply altering the numbers on financial statements.  Instead, as in 
Stoneridge, it works in the bowels of the business to alter what is reported 
in various transactions from which the totals in financial statements derive.  
This is why Congress, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, focused attention on as-
suring the adequacy of corporate internal controls.31  Congress recognized 
(unlike the majority in Stoneridge) that investors do not just rely on the ac-
curacy of the sum totals reported in the financial statements; they also indi-
rectly rely on the accuracy of all of the reporting of transactions that 
produce those totals.  In other words, to use a cliché, when it comes to the 





  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006) (link). 
30
  Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766, 769. 
31
  15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262 (2006) (link to § 7241) (link to § 7262). 
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According to the plaintiffs’ allegations, the false information entered 
the stream of internal reporting in Stoneridge when at least two parties 
made misrepresentations.  There were the Charter managers, who created 
the misrepresentations in documenting and reporting on the Charter side 
when they reported advertising revenue from the cable box transactions.  In 
addition, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola made misrepresentations in do-
cumenting and characterizing these transactions via the backdating and fal-
sification of their own documents.32  Hence, the Stoneridge majority’s focus 
on this being Charter’s fraud pretends that a fictional entity created finan-
cial statements, and ignores the parties who actually made the intentional 
misrepresentations reflected in those statements. 
D. Who Should Pay (Or Why Charter Was the Wrong Target in Stoneridge) 
To point out that it is people, rather than corporations, who make kno-
wingly false statements is not to imply that we should ignore the fiction and 
never hold corporations liable for false statements made in the company’s 
name.  In fact, the Securities Act of 1933 expressly calls for the issuing 
corporation, among others, to be liable to buyers in the event of misrepre-
sentation on the SEC registration statement filed prior to public offering.33  
Yet, before automatically assuming that the corporation is the party that 
should pay for any false statements promulgated in its name, it is useful to 
examine the actual impact of holding the corporation liable in a case such as 
Stoneridge.   
The plaintiffs in the Stoneridge case were persons who bought stock in 
Charter.  If Charter pays the plaintiffs, who is paying whom?  Assuming 
Charter is solvent, any recovery from Charter is ultimately at the expense of 
Charter’s shareholders.  If the plaintiffs have retained the stock they pur-
chased in Charter, in essence recovery from Charter means that the plain-
tiffs are simply paying themselves (at least to the extent of the plaintiffs’ 
shareholdings in the company).34  Perhaps, however, plaintiffs have sold the 





  To be consistent, it was employees of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola who made these misrepre-
sentations.  It appears, however, that these employees acted in order to obtain some benefit for Scientif-
ic-Atlanta and Motorola (free advertising or some other quid pro quo) and thus principles of vicarious 
liability attribute the employees’ acts to their companies. 
33
  15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (link).   
34
  There is also the impact of forcing a distribution from the corporation to the plaintiff sharehold-
ers.  When fraud involves the issuance of stock or securities by the corporation such that the plaintiffs 
have paid money either directly or indirectly to the corporation, the remedy of forcing the corporation to 
return the money produces a real remedy insofar as it unwinds the impact of the wrong.  In the more 
common Stoneridge situation—where the fraud involves corporate statements that impact market trad-
ing in which the corporation is not involved—it is less clear why the appropriate remedy for false state-
ments should be to force a distribution of money from the corporation to its own shareholders. 
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then we should substitute plaintiffs.35  If they sold after disclosure of the 
fraud, then we seemingly start to have a real transfer of wealth between 
shareholders as a result of recovery against the corporation—in this case,  
from those who bought the plaintiffs’ stock to the plaintiffs.  On the other 
hand, consider how, in a rational market, buyers should respond to this 
prospective outcome.  They should lower the price they are willing to pay 
following disclosure of securities fraud to offset prospective recovery 
against the corporation.  This means that corporate recovery simply lowers 
the price at which the plaintiffs are able to sell their stock, and, once again, 
all that is happening is that plaintiffs are essentially paying for their own re-
covery.   
The instance in which there is a real wealth transfer between share-
holders occurs if there are shareholders who bought into the corporation be-
fore the fraud and retained their stock until disclosure.  Yet, unless these 
shareholders were in on the fraud, what would be the rationale for having 
them effectively compensate the plaintiffs?  One might claim that they be-
nefited from the fraud if it led to an increase in stock prices.  Notice, how-
ever, that this benefit only accrues if the shareholder sells his stock during 
the period in which the fraud inflated the stock price; but, in this case, the 
selling shareholder no longer suffers the impact of recovery against the cor-
poration.  The irony is that the shareholders who benefited from the fraud 
do not end up having to pay for it, at least insofar as the plaintiffs’ remedy 
is recovery against the corporation.36 
So if the aim of imposing securities fraud liability is to discipline those 
who profited from a knowing misrepresentation, and if the corporation (like 
Charter) is the wrong target for such liability, who did profit from engaging 
in fraudulent conduct?  One answer, presumably, would be the Charter 
managers who fudged the numbers.37  Fortunately, lest all sanity has left the 
field after Stoneridge, such managers can be held liable as controlling per-
sons of Charter.38  The other parties who profited from their knowing mi-
srepresentations are Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.  They received free 





  Since buyers before disclosure of the fraud are purchasing based upon false market information, 
they should be plaintiffs.  Buyers who turned around and sold their shares before the fraud was disclosed 
have presumably not suffered any harm from the fraud. 
36
  Since it is possible for a shareholder to sell some stock and retain some stock, to be more precise, 
the more one benefits, the less one indirectly pays. 
37
  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless, and 
Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual 
Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2007) (advocating focusing liability upon the wrongdoing 
executives) (link). 
38
  Otherwise, we would have had the bizarre result that managers have escaped liability based upon 
the argument that it was the corporation’s fraud, not theirs.  For an example of a fraud case in which 
corporate officers are held liable for their actions, see Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433 
(9th Cir. 1987) (applying controlling person liability under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act) (link). 
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not get some benefit, one assumes they would not have engaged in misre-
presentations that might subject them to government prosecution.  
CONCLUSION 
One can generalize the forgoing analysis to suggest that the appropriate 
defendants in a securities fraud action often should include the so-called 
secondary players.  Specifically, the accountants, lawyers, investment bank-
ers, and others who engage in misrepresentations giving rise to false or mis-
leading corporate financial statements, and who receive substantial 
compensation for doing so, should be deemed liable.  If so, Stoneridge has 
created a result that, from a policy standpoint, is upside down: the law holds 
the corporation liable when there is typically no point in doing so, and al-
lows the parties who ought to pay—those who benefited from the fraudu-
lent actions—to escape liability (at least in private suits).  In the end, 
therefore, the Stoneridge case has taken an irrational state of law governing 
securities fraud actions under § 10(b)—with pointless actions against corpo-
rations—and made it even worse. 
 
 
